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Abstract
This study aims to understand the role of Facebook access and partisan bias on the belief in misinformation in the political
context of the 2019 Presidential Election. Frequent use of Facebook and partisan bias for presidential candidates were
predicted to influence belief in misinformation about illegal migrant workers from China in Indonesia. Using a structured
questionnaire, a total of 1,818 participants who were representative of the Indonesian voter population were interviewed
asking about their frequency of Facebook use, political support, awareness, and belief in misinformation about thousands
of illegal migrant workers from China, as well as other demographic variables as part of national survey questions. Of
these, there were 804 participants who were aware of misinformation about illegal migrant workers from China to be
analyzed. The results of binomial logistic regression analysis showed that partisan bias significantly affected belief in
misinformation—Subianto's (vs. Widodo's) supporters significantly have (vs. have not) a belief in the misinformation,
whereas the frequency of Facebook usage and the effect of their interactions were not significant. This finding shows the
strength of the influence of political support on belief in misinformation and the need to further study the influence of
social media in Indonesia's political context.

Bukan Akes Facebook, Tetapi Bias Partisan yang Memprediksi Kepercayaan pada
Misinformasi: Kasus Pilpres Indonesia 2019
Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh bias partisan dan penggunaan Facebook terhadap kepercayaan pada
misinformasi dalam konteks politik Pemilu Presiden 2019. Tingginya penggunaan Facebook dan bias partisan pada calon
presiden diprediksi akan mempengaruhi kepercayaan terhadap misinformasi mengenai tenaga kerja illegal dari Cina di
Indonesia. Sebanyak 1.818 partisipan yang representatif terhadap populasi pemilih Indonesia diwawancara dengan
kuesioner terstruktur tentang frekuensi menggunakan Facebook untuk mengakses berita politik, dukungan politik,
pengetahuan dan kepercayaan pada misinformasi mengenai ribuan tenaga kerja illegal dari Cina, termasuk pertanyaan
tentang demografi sebagai bagian dari survei nasional. Dari data ini, sebanyak 804 partisipan yang tahu tentang
misinformasi tersebut kemudian dianalisis. Hasil analisis dengan binomial logistic regression menunjukkan bahwa bias
partisan secara signifikan mempengaruhi kepercayaan pada misinformasi – pendukung Subianto (vs. Widodo) secara
signifikan percaya (vs. tidak percaya) terhadap misinformasi tersebut, sementara frekuensi menggunakan Facebook dan
interaksinya tidak signifikan mempengaruhi kepercayaan terhadap misinformasi. Temuan ini menunjukkan kekuatan
pengaruh dukungan politik terhadap kepercayaan pada misinformasi dan perlunya meneliti lebih lanjut tentang pengaruh
media sosial dalam konteks politik Indonesia.
Keywords: belief in misinformation, Facebook, partisan bias, political psychology, social media
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1. Introduction

interest (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Lippman,
Samuelsohn, & Arnsdorf, 2016). The results of the study
by Lippman et al. (2016) showed as much as one
misstatement every 5 min on average from Donald

After the 2016 US Presidential Election, misinformation
in the context of electoral politics has attracted research
154
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Trump's speeches and press conferences. This means that
voters are exposed to misinformation and vulnerable to
be affected to make wrong decisions. Research on
misinformation and the factors that influence it are
therefore crucial as part of efforts to minimize its
negative effects.

environment that perceived to be filled with fake news or
misinformation, for example, by being critical to
opinionated news, consumed cross-ideological sources,
and fact-checking (Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019). By
doing more research to address this gap, this
inconsistency of findings needs to be further explained.

Social media is referred to as a factor that helps spread
misinformation to many more individuals. In the context
of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, as
many as 380 million still share false news or
misinformation, and 760 million users are clicking and
reading false information, which is equivalent to three
misinformation read by American adults (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017). This widely shared misinformation
has been attributed to the content of that misinformation
using personally and emotionally targeted news (Bakir &
McStay, 2017). One of the social media applications that
got public criticism for the spread of misinformation is
Facebook. Studies have found that Facebook was one of
the primary sources of fake news; for example, Fourney,
Racz, Ranade, Mobius, and Horvitz (2017) found that
68% of page visit to fake news domain was from social
media, and of these, 99% referrals were from Facebook
(Fourney, et al., 2017). This raises new concerns about
the influence of social media (e.g., Facebook) on the
political process and democracy. To show concern about
the negative effect of social media on democracy, the
terms such as echo chamber and filter bubble (Pariser,
2011; Sunstein, 2001) have been used. Because of the
personalization and homogeneity of the environment it
provided to the users, the social media was considered as
the source of information bias, increasing polarization
and enhancing people's belief in misinformation that
were previously received.

During the 2019 Presidential Election in Indonesia,
various information about the two candidates, namely,
Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, have circulated.
Many misinformation spread and openly attacked both of
them, either about their personality or program and
policy. One of the misinformation that has circulated was
the rumor of the hundreds of thousands of illegal migrant
workers from China who seized the domestic labor
market. These rumors circulated widely and caused
considerable unrest to make the Ministry of Manpower
under the Widodo administration issued a rebuttal to the
rumors. This rumor was considered as one of the attacks
on incumbent Widodo.

The misinformation cannot be easily corrected by
providing evidence against it. Studies found that even
after retraction, people still rely on the misinformation
they had already believe—known as continued-influence
effect of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2011; Ecker,
Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017; Johnson & Seifert, 1994;
Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012).
The reliance on the retracted misinformation was
reflected in the form of memory that people had about the
misinformation and its effect on later inferences (Johnson
& Seifert, 1994). If the misinformation was related to
belief strongly held by people, this phenomenon could be
stronger. Individuals in this case could apply motivated
cognition that led them to exclude evidence that is
contrary to their attitude, and vice versa, and accept
evidence that is consistent with their views (Kunda,
1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). As a result, people
could further have a stronger belief in the misinformation
and misconceptions after retraction of the misinformation,
a phenomenon called a worldview backfire effect.
However, another stream of research found that people
could also develop ways to cope with the media
Makara Hubs-Asia

Misinformation in the form of negative issues circulated
in social media is thought so far to reduce the likelihood
of voters to choose the candidates who were framed
negatively. As shown in the results of research by a
number of public opinion survey institutions, support for
the two candidates however has not changed much in
recent months (e.g., Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2019).
This gave rise to the question about the relationship in
misinformation between social media access, political
support, and belief.
This study aims (1) to determine the relationship between
frequency of accessing political news on social media and
the belief in misinformation during the 2019 Presidential
Election, (2) to reveal the relationship between partisan
bias and the belief in misinformation, and (3) to understand
the interaction between the social media access and
partisan bias in prediction belief in the information
The term misinformation refers to information that is
inaccurate, erroneous, or even false, which is known and
considered valid by individuals, but then the information
is rectified because of such inaccuracies (Lewandowsky
et al., 2012). The term misinformation is closely related
to the term fake news, which is defined as “news articles
that are intentionally and verifiably fall, and could
mislead readers” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213).
There are six types of fake news, namely, news satire,
news parody, fabrication, manipulation, advertising, and
propaganda (Tandoc Jr, Lim, & Ling, 2018). All of them
could lead to bias and false judgment like the effect of
misinformation.
Misinformed is different from uninformed. Uninformed
means not having confidence in the correct answer of a
factual question, whereas misinformed means having
wrong beliefs or not supported by factual clues to the
December 2020 ½Vol. 24 ½ No. 2
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answer (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich,
2000). Individuals in misinformation believe information
that they know is something definite even if they are
wrong and consider themselves to know a fact (Kuklinski
et al., 2000; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Pasek, Sood, &
Krosnick, 2015). When it is contrary to one's belief, the
retraction of the misinformation was not effective (Ecker
& Ang, 2018). This distinguishes misinformation from
ignorance, which is basically a lack of knowledge or
information. Because it makes people to decide based on
false information, misinformation is seen as a problem in
democracy and public policy because the decisions taken
do not give the best results for them (Kuklinski et al.,
2000).
Misinformation can be disseminated without the
intention to mislead, for example, a disaster whose
information is still being updated by the authorities
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2017). Also,
because of the emotional content in the misinformation,
misinformation can also be in the form of rumors that are
unclear and spread by ordinary citizens (Berger, 2011).
However, misinformation can also be deliberately
disseminated by interested sources, such as governments
and politicians in the misinformation about ownership of
WMD in Iraq that the US government disseminates
(Arsenault & Castells, 2006), or interest groups in the
information and health disseminated by business groups
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman,
2008).
The relationships of partisan attitude and the tendency to
show motivated cognition and thus the reluctance to
change belief when received retracted misinformation
have been the focus of recent studies. Among them was
the meta-analysis from Jost et al. (2003) that confirmed
that many several psychological variables such as death
anxiety, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity, and needs
for order predicted political conservatism. More recent
studies, however, showed that conservatives and liberals
could show motivated cognition. Kahan (2013) found
that conservatives did no better or worse than liberals on
the information-processing measurement test associated
with cognitive bias. Moreover, conservatives and liberals
showed bias in the face of scientific information that did
not match with their prior belief (Nisbet, Cooper, &
Garret, 2015). Motivated cognition also has been studied
as the source of bias in the context of electoral politics.
Support for parties (i.e., Republicans and Democrats) or
support for one presidential candidate, for example, is
found to be one of the factors that influence perceptual
bias (Bartels, 2002), information processing bias (Taber
& Lodge, 2006), or become a shortcut to evaluate
information (Swire, Berinsky, Lewandowsky, & Ecker,
2017).
The Internet and social media are related to the belief in
misinformation. Belief in misinformation occurs because
Makara Hubs-Asia

social media provides users with a broader opportunity to
access content that is in accordance with individual
attitudes and beliefs so as to create their own echo
chamber (Lewandowsky et al., 2017). This is confirmed
by the results of Garrett, Weeks, and Neo (2016) studies,
which show that both Republicans and Democrats who
often access information from partisan sources of
ideology each tend to be more convinced of
misinformation even though they have received relevant
evidence about the President Obama's birthplace and the
existence of WMD in Iraq. This is possible because of the
presence of the internet and social media that make
individuals only access news that is in accordance with
their beliefs, creating their own bubble filters (Pariser,
2011).
Interest in research in the context of electoral politics on
the topic of misinformation surfaced especially after
Donald Trump's victory in the United States Presidential
Election, which was massive election misinformation
(Alcott & Getzkow, 2017; Lippman et al., 2016) with
misinformation sources for presidential candidate
Donald Trump itself (Alcott & Getzkow, 2017; Lippman
et al., 2016; Swire et al., 2017).
Particularly after the 2016 elections in the United States,
the spread of misinformation or fake news on social
media has raised concerns in recent years. In 2016 US
Presidential Election, it was suspected that massive
misinformation or news were spread (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017) and accessed through social media
(Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Because it can be forwarded
directly by users without going through the fact-checking
process by third parties, the spread of misinformation
was possible (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Not only its
accessibility but also the misinformation or fake news
could be widely circulated in social media because its
main character which used personally and emotionally
targeted news or referred to as empathic media (Bakir &
McStay, 2017). The misinformation was then followed
by Trump's victory in the Presidential Election, which
sparked concern for researchers from various
backgrounds, such as psychology, economics, political
science, communication, and computer science to
further examine it and then give recommendations on
how to intervene (Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Thorson,
2016).
Facebook is the most widely used platform to spread
misinformation in the 2016 US Election (Silverman,
2016), although many social media platforms are the
place for the circulation of misinformation. Since the
2016 elections in the United States, the results of research
on misinformation and Facebook's role in spreading
misinformation then encouraged Facebook to reduce the
spread of misinformation (Allcott, Gentzkow, & Yu,
2019).
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One of the big cases in Indonesia that showed the role of
social media in spreading misinformation and
influencing political choices was the Election of
Governor of Jakarta 2017. Viral circulation ahead of the
election spread an edited video about the incumbent
speech Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) described as
insulting Islam. There are still many people who believe
in the edited version of the video and do not choose
Ahok, although there have been corrections to the video
and Ahok's apology to Muslims. This shows that political
misinformation circulated on social media could be
impactful during the election.
Facebook is one of the social network sites (SNS) that is
widely used by many Indonesians. There were 1,174
million visits to Facebook in Indonesia in 2017. As many
as 41% of Internet users actively accessed Facebook (We
Are Social, 2018). According to a survey from Indikator
Politik Indonesia that reported that 43% of voters use
Facebook every day, the picture was also similar
(Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2019) or the highest among
SNSs. Indonesia in the global ranking was the fourth
biggest Facebook user in the world, after the United
States, Brazil, and India. Those reports indicate that
Facebook could also influence Indonesians voters'
political opinions, especially during the election. It still
not clear, however, about how the relationships between
access to Facebook and the belief of misinformation in
Indonesia. Hence, this research wanted to address the
question about the influence of voters' access to
Facebook with their belief in information during the
election.
Partisan bias, or the difference in belief in the same
information between political supporters, is one of the
factors found to influence belief in misinformation.
Partisan bias in the United States is measured by the
apparent difference between Democrats and Republicans
in addressing various facts and misinformation, for
example, the split between Democratic and Republican
supporters regarding ownership of WMD by Iraq
(Bullock, 2009). Four months after the United States
invaded Iraq in 2004, the results of a UN investigation
showed that Iraq did not have WMD. However, during
the invasion, around 40% of the Democrats claimed to
believe that Iraq had WMD, whereas 83% of the
Republicans claimed to believe. Even after a year of
invasion and the increasingly clear absence of WMD,
that belief still persisted and remained different between
Democrats and Republicans. About 35% of Democrats
believe, and 78% Republicans believe (see Bullock,
2009).
When there was misinformation that Obama was born
outside of the United States or rather was born in Kenya,
partisan bias was also recorded in the belief in the
birthplace of President Barack Obama. Only 8% against
such misinformation of Democrats believed, whereas
Makara Hubs-Asia

Republicans 45% (Harris Interactive, 2010). Partisan
bias, in terms of government policy, also occurs in citizen
evaluations of economic policies, the Gulf War, and
general government performance evaluations during
President Bush's administration. It appears that
Republicans tend to rate more positively than Democrats
based on NES panel data in 1990, 1991, and 1992
(Bartels, 2002). This difference indicates the role of
partisan bias in the perception of candidates and political
events. It is important to know the extent to which this
bias occurs based on research on the influence of partisan
attitudes on belief in misinformation in various contexts,
especially in the political context in Indonesia during the
2019 Presidential Election when voter polarization is
supported by presidential candidates.
Particularly in the 2014 presidential election in
Indonesia, misinformation—or what is known as a
hoax—in elections began to bloom. It began with the
publication of the Obor Rakyat Tabloid in May 2014 with
the title “Puppet president” with caricatures of
presidential candidate Widodo kissing the hand of PDIP
president Megawati Soekarnoputri, and in June 2014, the
second edition was published with the title “1001
Widodo Imaging Mask.” The tabloid is known to be
distributed to Islamic boarding schools and Islamic
schools in Central and East Java. In the tabloid, which
was later found to be a fake address, Widodo was
reported as a Chinese, non-Muslim, and a foreign agent
and PKI activist (Albanna, 2019; tempo.co 2018; Sufa &
Anam, 2014). While the attack on Subianto by using
misinformation also occurred with the circulation of the
Indonesia Barokah Tabloid ahead of the 2019
Presidential Election entitled “Reunion 212: Interest of
the People or Political Interest?” In the tabloid,
distributed in several areas in West Java to East Java,
Subianto was written in an article entitled “Prabowo
Angry Media Divided” in the Main Report and the article
“Deceiving the Public for Political Victory” as Special
Coverage (Azanella, 2019; Nathaniel, 2019).
Quite a number of people believe that Widodo is of
Chinese descent and non-Muslim as false news was first
disseminated through the Obor Rakyat, although cases of
misinformation from the two tabloids have been reported,
and the head of the Obor Rakyat has been found guilty of
spreading false news. This fact was reported in a national
survey release held by Indikator Politik Indonesia on
January 8, 2019. In this release, it was found that 20% of
respondents learned that Widodo's parents were
Christians, and among those who knew the news, as
many as 20% believed in the news that. Likewise, with
the misinformation about Widodo of Chinese ethnicity,
23% of respondents knew the news, and from that
number 24% believed in the news.
Misinformation ahead of the presidential election also
contained policy content and cornered the government or
December 2020 ½Vol. 24 ½ No. 2
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state institutions, in addition to misinformation with the
presidential candidates' personal content. Thus shifting
the local workforce, one of the many misinformation
referred to is the invasion of illegal migrant workers
(TKA) from China to Indonesia.
Thus far, it is not known to what extent the public knows
about this misinformation and whether the public
believes in such misinformation. This study therefore
aims to elaborate on the knowledge and belief of the
public, especially voters, in misinformation. The
misinformation used as a case study here is about the
existence of hundreds of thousands of illegal migrant
workers from China. It was predicted that partisan bias
caused by support for the presidential candidate, both
Widodo and Subianto, had an effect on the belief in the
misinformation because this misinformation contained a
negative charge for the incumbent presidential candidate
Widodo. Voters who support Widodo are predicted to
tend to not believe in misinformation about hundreds of
thousands of illegal migrant workers from China, and
vice versa, supporters of Subianto are predicted to tend
to believe.
The following three main hypotheses were formulated in
this study, based on a review of the literature on election
misinformation, as well as the role of social media access
and partisan bias in the belief in misinformation:
1. Voters who were more frequent in accessing political
news through Facebook are predicted to be more
belief in the misinformation of illegal Indonesian
migrant workers.
2. Political support for presidential candidates
influences belief in misinformation of illegal migrant
workers from China:
2a. Supporters of Joko Widodo are predicted to
have less belief in misinformation of illegal
Indonesian migrant workers; and vice versa,
2b. Supporters of Prabowo Subianto are predicted to
have more belief in the misinformation of illegal
Indonesian migrant workers.
3. The frequency of accessing political news through
Facebook interacts with partisan bias caused by
support for presidential candidates to influence belief
in misinformation:
3a. Supporters of Joko Widodo who are more
frequent in accessing political news through
Facebook are predicted to have less belief of the
misinformation of illegal Indonesian migrant
workers compared with those who rarely access,
and vice versa,
3b. Supporters of Prabowo Subianto, who more
frequent in accessing political news through
Facebook are predicted to have more belief in
the misinformation of illegal Indonesian
migrant workers.

Makara Hubs-Asia

2.

Methods

This research used nationally representative data of
Indonesian voters to test the three hypotheses. As much
as 1,818 participants were interviewed for this research.
The survey population was all Indonesian citizens from
34 provinces who had voting rights, namely, those aged
17 years above or married when the survey was
conducted. The participants selected by the multi-stage
random sampling method with the margin of error at
±2.34%, assuming simple random sampling at a 95%
confidence level. By returning to selected respondents,
quality control is carried out on 20% of the total
respondents in each survey, and the results found no
significant errors. The interviews were carried out by
Indikator Politik Indonesia in March 2019 or about 1
month before April 17, 2019, Presidential Election
voting. This research would obtain data that
representative to describe the attitude and behavior of
eligible voters in Indonesia with this probabilistic
nationwide survey.
Belief in misinformation was measured by two questions:
whether participants know about the information about
hundreds of thousands of illegal (unofficial and illegal)
migrant workers from China entering Indonesia. If
participants know about the item, they then asked
whether they were believed or not about the information.
The analysis was performed only for “know” answer and
not missing in the question about the belief.
Because it was one of dividing issues between both
camps of candidate supporters during the 2019
Presidential Election, misinformation about illegal
migrant workers from China was chosen here. The
government through the Manpower Minister Hanif
Dakhiri denied the misinformation. Chinese migrant
workers in Morowali, according to Dakhiri,—locations
where factories that were built with investments from
China rumored to be illegal migrant worker shelters—
were legal and far fewer in number than local workers. In
one of his press reports reported by Kumparan.com,
Dakhiri explained that investment from China in
Morowali opened up new jobs for local workers. Of the
25,447 workers, there were only 3,121 migrant workers
from China or about 10.9% (Budi, 2018).
Misinformation about hundreds of thousands of illegal
migrant workers from China is still circulating in the
community, especially through text messages and social
media, although it has been denied and corrected. The
issue of TKA then became the topic of the vicepresidential debate on March 17, 2018. Candidate vice
president number 02, Sandiaga Uno, also raised this issue
to question the incumbent policy amid the still high
unemployment in Indonesia.
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Access to political news on social media focuses on
Facebook by asking “In the past month, how often did
you get news related to social, political and government
issues at the regional or national level through the
following application?” With a 6-point Likert-type scale
(1 = don't have account, 6 = every day/almost every day).
In data analysis, mean-centered has been done on these
data. This research focuses on people's consumption of
Facebook because of the extensive use of Facebook
compared with other SNS globally and nationally
although the survey questions asked several SNS.
Partisan attitudes toward presidential candidates were
measured by two different questions for Joko Widodo
and Subianto. On a scale of 0–10 (0 = Will not vote for,
10 = Will vote for), participants were asked how much the
possibility of choosing presidential candidate number 01
Joko Widodo (KH Ma'ruf Amin) or number 02 Prabowo
Subianto (Sandiaga Uno).
The scores obtained are then analyzed using the Binomial
Logistic Regression model because the independent
variable is a nominal scale.
A number of variables are controlled, namely,
demographic questions that included age, gender, urbanrural area, and education. Three variables are made
dummy variables because it is a nominal scale, namely,
urban-rural variables (1 = rural, 0 = urban), gender (1 =
female, 0 = male), and education (1 = junior high and
below 0 = senior high school and above).

3. Results
Of the 1,818 data entered, as many as 804 were processed
further, namely, data from participants who answered
“know” information about the existence of illegal
migrant workers from China and not missing in question
about their belief in misinformation. From these data,
42.2% of women and 57.8% of men with an average age
of 36.42 years (SD = 13.71); 40.6% live in rural areas and
59.4% in urban areas. Participants with Javanese
ethnicity 41.3%, Sundanese 18.5%, Malay 3.6%, Batak
4.6%, Madura 1.4%, Betawi 3.9%, Minang 3.1%, Bugis
2.5%, Bali 2.5%, Chinese 3.2%, and other ethnicities
15.7%. The majority are Muslim 91.5%, then Protestant
and Catholic Christians 5.6%, and others 2.8%. As many
as 41.0% based on education had junior high school
education or lower and 59.0% had high school education
and above (see table 1).
Statistical analysis of binary logistic regression with the
dependent variable is the belief in misinformation carried
out in four models: Model (1), analysis to control the
demographic variables of age, sex, rural-urban, and
education; Model (2), analysis of the frequency of access
to political news through Facebook; Model (3), analysis
of support for Widodo, and support for Subianto; Model
(4), an analysis of the interactions of each between the
frequency of political news access through Facebook
with support for Widodo and support for Subianto. The
summary of the analysis is shown in Table 2.

Table 1. Descriptive table of variables
Variables
Know about the misinformation

n

%

M

SD

I know

863

47.4

-

-

I don’t know

956

52.6

-

-

I believe

606

75.3

-

-

I don’t believe

199

24.7

-

-

FB access (1-6 point scale)

805

-

2.74

1.73

Support Widodo (0-10 point scale)

787

-

5.90

3.37

Support Subianto (0-10 point scale)

786

-

5.66

3.33

Female

340

42.2

-

-

Male

465

57.8

-

-

Rural

327

40.7

-

-

Urban

478

59.3

-

-

Junior high school and below

326

40.5

-

-

Senior high school and above

479

59.5

-

-

Belief in misinformation (among those who knows)

Sex

Living area

Education

Makara Hubs-Asia
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0.18 1.13 [0.80, 1.60]

Education (1=Mid-low) 0.12
0.06 0.97 [0.87, 1.08]

0.19 1.09 [0,76, 1.57]

0.18 1.28 [0.91, 1.81]

0.18 1.27 [0.89, 1.80]

B

0.58 0.01

0.64 0.28

0.16 0.41

0.18 0.20

0.00 -0.16

p

95% CI

0.99
0.00

0.22 1.00 [0.64, 1.55]
0.04 0.88 [0.80, 0.95]
0.03 1.08 [1.00, 1.17]

0.00 -0.13
0.02 0.08

0.03

804

Pseudo R²

N
804

0.03

χ² = 15.88 df = 5 p = 0.00

804

0.13

χ² = 70.41 df = 7 p = 0.00

0.02 1.00 [0.96, 1.04]

804

0.13

χ² = 70.58 df = 9 p = 0.00

-799.25

0.87 0.00

0.02 0.99 [0.95, 1.04]

0.16

0.19 1.31 [0.89, 1.92]

0.16 0.27

0.80

0.92

0.03

0.02

0.03

p

0.18 1.51 [1.05, 2.18]

0.03 0.42

Log Likehood

χ² = 15.57 df = 4 p = 0.00

95% CI

0.28

0.00

Model Chi-Square

OR

0.00 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]

SE

(4)

0.18 1.22 [0.84, 1.76]

0.28 0.20

FB*SupSubianto

0.04 1.09 [1.01, 1.17]

0.04 0.87 [0.80, 0.94]

0.06 1.01 [0.89, 1.13]

0.20 1.32 [0.90, 1.93]

0.19 1.50 [1.04, 2.16]

0.19 1.22 [0.84, 1.76]

B

0.03 -0.02

p

0.00

-799.42

OR

0.01 0.99 [0.97, 0.99]

SE

(3)

FB*SupWidodo

0.08

-853.94

95% CI

Support Subianto

-0.03

0.50 0.09

0.14 0.25

0.15 0.24

OR

0.00 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]

SE

-0.13

-854.26

B

0.00 -0.02

p

(2)

Support Widodo

FB Usage

0.18 1.30 [0.92, 1.83]

0.26

Rururban (1=Rural)

0.18 1.29 [0.91, 1.82]

0.25

Sex (1=Female)

0.01 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]

-0.02

Age

OR

95% CI

SE

Variable

B

(1)

Model

DV: Belief in misinformation (0 = Don’ t believe, 1 = Believe)

Table 2.Summary of Binomial Logistic Regression Analysisfor Prediction Belief in Misinformation
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In Model (1), the age variable significantly predicts belief
in misinformation about illegal migrant workers from
China in a negative direction (B = −0.02, SE = 0.01,
Exp(B) = 0.98, p = 0.00). This means that the younger
the participants tend to have a stronger belief in
misinformation about illegal migrant worker from China.
The odds of the belief in misinformation decreases by a
factor of 0.98 for every unit increase in the age variable.
Model (1) can be used to explain the belief in the
misinformation about illegal migrant worker from China,
χ²(4, N = 804) = 15.57, p = 0.00, but the pseudo R² value
= 0.03 or explain only 3% of the variance in belief in
misinformation.
The results of the analysis in Model (2), the frequency of
accessing political news through Facebook does not
significantly predict belief in misinformation about
illegal migrant worker from China (B = −0.03, SE = 0.06,
Exp(B) = 0.97, p = 0.58). While the age variable still
significantly predicts belief in misinformation (B =
−0.02, SE = 0.01, Exp(B) = 0.98, p = 0.00). Model (2)
can be used to explain the belief in belief in misinformation
about illegal migrant worker from China, χ²(5, N = 804)
= 15.88, p = 0.00, but the pseudo R² value = 0.030 or
explain only 3% of the variance in belief in misinformation.
Model (3) shows that support for Widodo (B = −0.13, SE
= 0.04, Exp(B) = 0.87, p = 0.00) significantly predicts
belief in misinformation about illegal migrant workers
from China in a negative direction. This means that the
greater support for Widodo will reduce belief in
misinformation about illegal migrant worker from China.
For every unit increase in the support for Widodo, the
odds of the belief in misinformation decreases by a factor
of 0.87. Support for Subianto in contrast (B = 0.09, SE =
0.04, Exp(B) = 1.09, p = 0.02) significantly predict belief
in misinformation about illegal migrant workers from
China. The odds of the belief in misinformation increases
by a factor of 1.09 for every unit increase in the support
for Subianto. This finding shows that the greater support
for Subianto will increase belief in the misinformation of
illegal migrant worker from China. Age consistently
predicts belief in misinformation in negative direction
misinformation (B = −0.02, SE = 0.01, Exp(B) = 0.99, p
= 0.03). Rural–urban also significantly predicts belief in
this misinformation in a positive direction (B = 0.41, SE
= 0.19, Exp(B) = 1.5, p = 0.03), which means that rural
residents have stronger belief in the misinformation.
Overall, Model (3) can be used to explain the belief in
misinformation about illegal migrant worker from China,
χ²(7, N = 804) = 70.42, p = 0.00, with a pseudo R² value
= 0.13 or explain 13% of the variance in belief in
misinformation.
The analysis in Model (4) shows that the interaction
between the frequency of access to political news through
Facebook with support for Widodo (B = −0.00, SE = 0.02,
Exp(B) = 0.99, p = 0.93) and Subianto (B = 0.00, SE =
Makara Hubs-Asia

0.02, Exp(B) = 1.00, p = 0.80) did not significantly
predict belief in misinformation. As with Model (3)
before, age (B = −0.02, SE = 0.01, Exp(B) = 0.99, p =
0.03), rural–urban (B = 0.42, SE = 0.19, Exp(B) = 1.52, p
= 0.03), support for Widodo (B = −0.13, SE = 0.04,
Exp(B) = 0.87, p = 0.00) and support for Subianto (B =
0.08, SE = 0.04, Exp(B) = 1.09, p = 0.04) significantly
predicts belief in misinformation about illegal migrant
worker from China. The findings in terms of the odds
ratio show that for every unit increase in support for
Widodo and age variable, the odds of the belief in
misinformation decrease by a factor of 0.87 and 0.99.
While for every unit increase in support for Subianto and
for voters in rural areas compared with urban, the odds of
the belief in misinformation increase by a factor of 1.09
and 1.52. Overall, Model (4) can be used to explain the
belief in misinformation about illegal migrant worker
from China, χ²(9, N = 804) = 70.58, p = 0.00, with a
pseudo R² value = 0.13 or explain 13% of the variance in
belief in misinformation.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not confirmed by data. The
frequency of access to political news through Facebook
does not significantly increase the probability of belief in
misinformation about illegal migrant worker from China.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are confirmed by data. Support for
Joko Widodo significantly reduced the probability of the
belief in misinformation, and vice versa, support for
Prabowo Subianto significantly increased the probability
of belief in the misinformation, whereas Hypotheses 3a
and 3b are not confirmed by data. Between the frequency
of accessing political news through Facebook with
support for Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto in
predicting belief in the misinformation about illegal
migrant worker from China, there is no significant
influence from the interaction.

4. Discussion
This research shows that political support significantly
affects beliefs about misinformation. Voters, in the 2019
Presidential Election which was the context of this study,
who supported Widodo significantly did not believe in
misinformation about the thousands of illegal migrant
workers from China in Indonesia. Conversely, voters
who supported Subianto significantly believed in the
misinformation.
This is in line with research on the influence of partisan
bias on belief in misinformation in the context of US
politics that categorizes voters based on their party
identification, namely, the Republic versus Democrats.
Republicans and Democrats have different beliefs in
misinformation on various issues, such as WMD
ownership in Iraq, the birthplace of Barack Obama, and
the evaluation of government policies. The category of
voters in Indonesia is not based on the party identification
but based on support for presidential candidates in the
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2019 Presidential Election. The finding from this
research shows that partisan bias, either based on
political parties or support for candidates, can have the
same effect for belief in misinformation. In perceptions
that form a belief in misinformation, political support can
cause bias. This is also in line with the findings of
motivated cognition, which shows that individuals tend
to believe (or not believe) in the information that supports
(or does not support) their opinions, even though the
information has been retracted. Each camp, both Widodo
and Subianto supporters were motivated to believe or not
believe in the misinformation. Widodo's supporters in
this case did not believe in the misinformation of
thousands of illegal migrant workers from China in
Indonesia, and conversely, by Subianto's supporters. This
finding shows that in the context of political support
based on the choice of presidential candidates, belief in
misinformation also occurs, as is party-based polarization.
This study however shows that the frequency of
accessing political news on Facebook does not
significantly influence belief in misinformation.
Likewise, the interaction between political support and
the frequency of accessing political news on Facebook do
not significantly influence belief in misinformation. This
finding is different from the findings of Garrett, Weeks,
and Neo (2016) that confirmed the influence of social
media usage and partisan bias on belief in
misinformation. This contradiction brought questions
about the role of social media (e.g., Facebook) on belief
in misinformation and the measurement issue. Based on
a study from Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) about
selective exposure using pre-election survey responses
and web traffic data, Facebook was the most important
factor that facilitates the spread of fake news, but at the
end, they who finally visited and heavily consumed fake
news website came only from the small proportion of
people—10% of Americans with the most conservative
information consumption pattern. This means that social
media consumption per se could not be used to predict
the belief in misinformation. On the contrary, people
selectively chose fake news media could be because of
their partisan attitude. And this brings partisan bias as the
central point in the study about belief in misinformation
and media.
Further research should elaborate on the concept and
methods of the attitudinal and behavioral mechanism of
the role of partisan bias and media on belief in
misinformation. Guess et al. (2018) stated that research
related to social media need to measure real behavior to
capture people's media behavior and its effects.
Moreover, further research should also consider to
analyze how multiple media usage might relate people's
belief in misinformation. This research only focused on
the support of candidates as an indicator of partisan bias
in the Indonesian election. Further research should also
study not only support for a candidate but political
Makara Hubs-Asia

ideology and personality as variables that could also
affect belief in misinformation. It will not be easy to
define political ideology in Indonesia because there are
many political parties, but study about Indonesia political
ideology usually capture the different attitude between
secularists and religious people (e.g., Mujani, Liddle, &
Ambardi, 2018; Pepinsky, Liddle, & Mujani, 2018). This
category could also apply in the study about belief in
misinformation.
The scope of the misinformation should also be considered.
This study only focused on one misinformation that
heavily circulated among people. Further research
needs to study many kinds of misinformation to
understand, which issues will be most believed as a
function of partisan bias and social media consumption.
The kind of social media consumed could also influence
the relations between partisan bias and belief in
misinformation because social media have their own
unique feature and serve for a different purpose. Further
research should consider to study the influence of diverse
media consumption (i.e., different social media, text
messaging [i.e., WhatsApp and Line], or social and mass
media) in this context. This suggestion is in line with
Dubois and Blank (2018) who found that echo chamber
has been lessened among people who were interested in
politics and those with diverse media diet. Those
variables in further research will be valuable for us to
understand more about the interplay between partisan
bias, social media behavior, and belief in misinformation.

5. Conclusion
This study shows that partisan bias significantly influences
belief in misinformation, although the use of social
media does not significantly influence this belief
misinformation. This finding opens the opportunity for
further research regarding belief in misinformation and
how far the social media influences it, especially in the
political context in Indonesia.
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